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Hacking the Extended Mind: The Security Implications of the New 
Metaphysics1 
 
Robin L. Zebrowski 




Computer security expert Paul Syverson has argued that there is a computer security 
equivalent of gaslighting: where a clever adversary could convince some system that 
some component that is not really a part of the system is in fact a part of the system. If 
non-biological items from our environments (or even pieces of our environments 
themselves) can be part of our minds (the standard Extended Mind hypothesis, EM), 
they are therefore part of our selves, and therefore subject to Syverson’s worry about 
boundary in a way that has not been explored before. If some version of EM holds, then 
what were once security concerns surrounding various systems or devices become 
those same concerns but writ large for our cognitive processes, the core of mind and 
thought. Philosophers and critics have long been worried that if EM is true, selfhood 
bleeds out of the nicely-contained package of skin and skull. Criticism has been offered 
that argues if we allow some of the environment to count as genuinely part of our minds, 
it seems to threaten the existence of our phenomenal feeling of ownership over our own 
bodies, and the worry persists that selfhood itself becomes threatened with dissolution. 
Yet if we agree with Clark and understanding selfhood as fundamentally dispersed and 
therefore only imperiled by the more traditional view of some core, persistent notion of 
self, the security worry remains. No matter how we adjust our foundational metaphysics 
to account for the extended mind hypothesis, we are stuck with the security concerns, 
and we must start to catalog and account for the challenges before we see actual 
adversarial attacks on the actual devices constituting the minds of real people. Thinking 
about the very nature of the mind turns out to provide insight into how we think about 
security, and vice versa. 
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One random day in 2019, at 1.50am, I received a notification on my phone, from my 
phone. It said, simply, “You have a new memory- June 16, 2016.” The phone wasn’t just 
reporting on some organizational criteria set previously, and it wasn’t some special app 
designed for nostalgia; it was the stock “photos” app, inventing a new gallery of three-
year old photos, presumably to remind the user of an event that some algorithm decided 
reached a threshold of engagement. But the experience served its purpose: the images 
showed a fun day that had been long forgotten, and so the phone was not wrong in its 
                                                          
1 The central theses of this paper were suggested to me by Paul Syverson, and its content is the result of 
extensive discussions with and comments from him. I owe him a great debt in helping me refine these 
ideas. This version of this paper is submitted “as presented” at CEPE 2019 in Norfolk, Virginia at Old 
Dominion University, and is meant to be a snapshot of the conference presentation more than a complete 
and robust argument. A more detailed version is forthcoming. 
declaration of a “new memory.” I looked at the phone, recalled a pleasant visit to a 
beloved ice cream shop in NJ with my then-toddler, and recognized with trepidation that 
it was, in fact, a new memory. Was the word “memory” a misnomer applied in this way? 
And if not, was the memory generated by the phone, or stored by it, the twenty-first 
century augmented version of work usually done by a brain? 
 In the more than twenty years since Clark and Chalmers published “The 
Extended Mind,” there have been dozens of volumes written exploring the veracity of 
the claims they made as well as the potential implications for a number of branches of 
philosophy. Here, I present an area of impact (security) that has been under-explored, 
with a novel approach that I hope will lead to new ways of thinking about both the 
mind/self and new ways of approaching security in relation to certain devices and 
aspects of our environment that might rightly be said to play a constitutive role in our 
selfhood. This paper will describe the basic claims of the extended mind hypothesis, 
discuss the relationship between mind/self, both ontologically and in the extended mind 
literature, and then introduce the notion of gaslighting in relation to systems (broadly) 
with a self-concept (broadly). I’ll then argue that there are multiple metaphysical pictures 
that are consistent with the extended mind hypothesis, and these security worries 
remain regardless of which version holds. 
 
 
Extended Mind Hypothesis 
 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) offer an illustration in order to introduce the possibility that 
we (in the West, anyway) have been largely mistaken about the boundaries of the mind. 
They propose thinking about three different ways we might interact with a Tetris-like 
game, regarding how we manipulate the pieces to test for spatial fit (7). In the first case, 
the subject uses mental rotation to determine fit. In the second case, the subject has a 
choice to either use mental rotation or to use a rotate button that displays on the screen. 
They correctly speculate that using the physical rotate button might confer some speed 
advantages over mental rotation. In the third case, we are to imagine a future wherein 
the subject has a neural implant which is as fast as the physical rotation option in the 
second case, but which the subject has the option to use or not use in any given 
scenario. They then ask how much cognition is present in each of these cases. The 
argument they offer equates the third case (neural implant) with the first case (mental 
rotation), and the third case with the second case (physical button + screen), and 
concludes that if we are willing to allow the third case to count as cognitive (it is internal, 
neural, computationally similar) then it would seem the second case is equally cognitive 
(it just happens to loop in the hand, the keyboard, and the screen in a slightly different 
way). If you are willing to allow this possible cognitive equivalence, then the authors 
have successfully challenged the notion that brain and mind are the same thing, or even 
that body and mind are the same. Instead, they claim, properly understood, certain tools 
in our environments are also genuinely cognitive, not merely causally but constitutively, 
meaning that one’s mind is not contained to one’s body in some cases. 
 The authors offer another scenario to illustrate the general argument by 
introducing the fictional characters of Otto and Inga (ibid, 12). Briefly, Inga is 
neurotypical, and Otto has Alzheimer’s. We might imagine that Inga wishes to visit the 
museum, thinks about it for a moment to remember where it is, recalls the museum is 
on 54th Street, and then goes there. As a result of his memory difficulties, Otto carries a 
notebook with him everywhere he goes, wherein he writes down important information 
he needs to remember. He, too, wants to visit the museum, consults his notebook, 
learns the museum is on 54th Street, and off he goes. The important move here comes 
via the notion of belief: Inga believes the museum is on 54th while she’s on her way 
there, but it would be wrong to claim that she doesn’t have such a belief even when she 
isn’t thinking about it. (She has a non-occurrent belief before she calls up its location in 
her memory.) The notebook, then, is claimed to serve the same function for Otto as 
Inga’s biological memory serves for her. It should follow, then, that Otto, too has a non-
occurrent belief that the museum is on 54th, and like Inga’s belief, his becomes 
occurrent when he looks it up and sets off.  
 The tricky part, then, is the claim that the belief lives outside of Otto’s head, in the 
notebook. Again, volumes have been written on this claim (Adams and Aizawa 2008, 
Menary 2006, Clark 2008, Estany and Sturm, 2014, Robbins and Aydede 2009, 
Schantz, 2004), so it won’t be heavily defended here. I will simply assume the extended 
mind hypothesis is plausible. Clark and Chalmers refer to this idea as the Parity 
Principle, and it is understood to be a rule of thumb rather than a law of nature: if 
something would be called cognitive, were it done in the head, then it should also be 
called cognitive when it uses tools external to the body. If I use a pen and paper to 
compute a long division problem, but you are a math whiz who can do the entire 
computation unaided (“in your head”), then we ought to consider my brain/body plus the 
pen and paper cognitively equivalent to your brain/body. There are a number of reasons 
we might care about the veracity of the claim. Clark (2003) argues, “We exist, as the 
thinking things we are, only thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, and cultural 
and technological scaffolding. Understanding this evolutionarily novel arrangement is 
crucial for our science, our morals, and our self-image both as persons and as a 
species” (11). The sense of self that he refers to here and elsewhere (5) is part of what 





Unless you are a very strict Cartesian, you probably don’t equate your mind and your 
self. While the notion of the extended mind has been heavily explored, the idea of the 
extended self has been somewhat less so (at least in these terms)2. Where mind and 
self are collapsed, they are mostly collapsed for historical reasons (see, again, 
Descartes, who really screwed us.) I hope to engage in a more extended argument for 
the extended self in a future version of this paper, but for now I look to the original Clark 
and Chalmers paper again for validation that the extended mind likely also entails an 
extended self: “Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so. Most of 
us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; my 
dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense part of who I am. If so, 
then these boundaries may also fall beyond the skin. The information in Otto's 
                                                          
2 For one important argument for the extended self, see Malafouris (2008) 
notebook, for example, is a central part of his identity as a cognitive agent. What this 
comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of 
biological organism and external resources”(18). It seems that Clark and Chalmers think 
the extended mind is primary, and selfhood likely follows. Perhaps there is an argument 
to be made that the notion of the extended self does not rely on the notion of the 
extended mind at all, and Otto’s notebook might still be a candidate case. While I will 





Since rising to prominence in the late 1950s/early 1960s, functionalism has remained 
one of the most popular views of mind in philosophy. Importantly, the relationship of the 
extended mind to functionalist views is somewhat messy and hotly debated. The basic 
claim of the functionalist view is that the nature of mind rests on the causal relationships 
between various mental states, inputs, and outputs, as opposed to something like 
reductive materialism, where the mental states are instead considered identical to some 
specific physical state (this is the view that would argue, for example, that a neural firing 
is identical to seeing the color blue. Functionalism, instead, would talk about some set 
of causal relations, usually starting with some stimulus in the world acting on some blue-
detecting system, producing some outcome such as “says, ‘this is blue’”.)  
 This paper does not intend to defend or attack functionalism, but mentions it 
because of an ongoing debate about whether functionalism itself logically entails the 
extended mind/self. This debate is only relevant insofar as the functionalist view 
remains popular, and many who would deny the extended mind hypothesis would fully 
endorse functionalism, and it isn’t clear whether this is a consistent view to hold or not. 
The debate is again beyond the scope of this paper, but the range of ways of framing 
the problem is at least curious, and perhaps this paper’s argument rests on one of these 
claims in ways I have not fully considered yet. Sprevak (2009) argues that functionalism 
does entail the extended mind, and therefore concludes that functionalism itself is 
proven wrong as a result of such an absurd conclusion. Wheeler (2010) instead agrees 
that the extended mind is entailed by functionalism, but then says that the result is how 
we know both of these views must be correct, since functionalism is correct. Adams and 
Aizawa (2001) have argued that functionalism does not entail the extended mind, but 
they also do not think that it precludes it (they just haven’t yet seen evidence for the 
extended mind). Rupert (2004), too, argues that functionalism does not entail the 
extended mind, but also thinks that it doesn’t preclude it. Rounding out all possible 
views, Miyazono (2015) argues that functionalism entails that the extended mind must 
be false.  
 Even in its earliest explorations, the extended mind was lurking in discussions of 
functionalism. In his famous paper arguing against Functionalism, Block acknowledges, 
“if we are ‘full power’ Turing Machines, the environment must constitute part of the tape” 
(213). It remains somewhat surprising that forty years after Block wrote this, the 
relationship between the extended mind and functionalism remains so complicated.  
 Again, I mention functionalism and the debate about its relationship to the 
extended mind hypothesis largely to dissipate any immediate pushback on the idea 
from the standpoint of functionalism. As we can see, the debate is ongoing and 
consensus seems far from settled on the matter. I believe (or hope) that this means I do 
not need to come down in any settled manner for or against any version of functionalism 




Systems Security and Gaslighting 
 
If you have a system that has some sort of self-representation, then an adversary might 
attempt to convince the system that some component that is not really a part of the 
system is in fact part of the system. The system then might trust and protect the 
adversarial piece as a part of itself. The system may then end up trusting something 
malicious or protecting something foreign that is not a legitimate part of the system in 
question. Conversely, an adversary might convince the system that some component of 
itself is not part of the system. The system might then ignore inputs from that 
component or indicators about the state of that component as not self-relevant. In the 
case of the extended self, we are such systems, and our external devices are potentially 
targets in a way not previously appreciated.  Successful attacks then amount to a form 
of gaslighting, manipulating someone to intentionally cause them to doubt their own 
perceptions or memory. 
 If you create confusion about the boundaries of the self of the system, a number 
of possibilities follow. You can make it ignore some parts of itself. You can make it treat 
some part of itself as not-itself. You can make it treat some part of not-itself as itself. 
You can make it treat some part of itself as another. In each case, the adversary is then 
well-positioned to leverage the confusion.  
 Cooley (1902) famously remarked that, “I am not what I think I am; and I am not 
what you think I am; I am what I think you think I am.”  Thus, to some extent, your self-
concept already encompasses some adversaries; they help define who and what you 
understand yourself to be. A mouse, for example, has a very different representation of 
itself than I would in an environment where it perceives a cat perceiving it. Its survival is 
entwined with its sense of cats as adversaries in a way mine is not.  
 If the extended self is plausible (which it seems to be), and this framework for 
understanding adversarial relations to a system using a technique like gaslighting is 
plausible (which it seems to be), then this same framework applies easily to our external 
suite of tools when they meet the conditions to count as part of ourselves. For example, 
women often rely heavily on period tracker apps on smartphones, offloading vital 
memory and prediction information to such apps and trusting the information they 
supply in return. In a May 2019 article, the Guardian reported that one such app was 
created and supported by opponents of abortion and had been encouraging women to 
forego hormonal birth control in favor of trusting the app and its predictions about fertility 
in their quests to avoid (or achieve) pregnancy (Glenza, 2019). They go on to report, 
“two of the app’s medical advisors are not licensed to practice in the US and are also 
closely tied to a Catholic university in Santiago, Chile, where access to abortion remains 
severely restricted.” The argument that the smart phone may qualify as an extension of 
myself is established, if controversial, and certain apps on such a phone would likely 
qualify even more clearly, particularly in a case like this, where this is cognitive work 
related to self-preservation that is often offloaded onto external tools. Eva Galperin, a 
security researcher at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in discussing the threats 
posed by online stalkers, noted that, “full access to someone’s phone is essentially full 
access to someone’s mind” (Greenberg, 2019). 
 We can imagine a number of gaslighting-style errors that we make on a bodily 
level that might help support the claims I want to make about adversarial worries with 
regard to the extended mind. Certain kinds of visual illusions would seem to fall under 
this umbrella, as for example when some aspect of our visual system becomes fatigued 
and it produces an effect that fools us into imagining we see movement where there is 
none, or in the Hermann Grid illusion, where darkness appears where only white space 
exists. These effects happen as a normal by-product of our visual systems functioning 
correctly; they aren’t errors, but instead could be described as our bodies tricking 
themselves as a result of their otherwise-normal behavior. This would be a gaslighting-
style error insofar as anyone with a basic understanding of these sorts of visual 
processes could (hypothetically) leverage that exploit against us, having our eyes report 
that we are seeing something that we aren’t actually seeing. Another example might 
involve clever pickpocketing techniques. Paul Syverson tells a story about how he 
witnessed an expert pickpocket (Apollo Robbins) describe his trade in front of an 
audience. When the pickpocket introduced himself to the target, he grabbed his 
shoulder and shook his hand, and otherwise touched him a bit more forcefully than is 
normally expected (but not so far out of the bounds of normal as to stand out as 
inappropriate to the target). The pickpocket was then able to remove the target’s watch 
in front of a live audience without the target noticing. In effect, what the pickpocket did 
was fatigue the touch sensors of the target’s body, such that a very light touch didn’t 
register and rise to conscious awareness, because the target had felt such strong 
pressure during the greeting. This is a kind of attack on the self-model of the target 
insofar as it’s training him to alter that model via the relative significance attached to 
those signals. This is obviously exploitable, but it is also a gaslighting-style error on a 
bodily level, where a person is not experiencing the touch on their body as touch on 
their body. Therefore, it’s easy to see how this kind of error can happen on the bodily-
level. But what about the tool-level? 
 As long as we restrict the tools here to those tools relevant to your self-concept in 
an extended system, we can imagine several concrete ways this might work. In addition 
to the app mentioned above, we can also imagine messaging systems, when they are 
well-integrated into your daily life and existence in a way that qualifies under the 
extended mind/self conditionals, that may exploit this access in a similar way. A 
message may arrive purporting to be from some trusted source, but it is not from such a 
source. Such messages (and the systems that enable them, again only when those 
systems are well-integrated into your self-concept) may qualify as this kind of exploit. 
The argument here is not that there is something novel in this kind of exploit, popular for 
many decades, but that when those devices and systems are part of the extended self, 
the exploit serves a more serious kind of attack on the person than previously 
recognized.3  
We might also think of the way some machine learning algorithms are being 
automatically endorsed by people in certain situations such that they come to rely on 
the output of such algorithms in their everyday lives or work without considering double-
checking on that output.4 But of course, the ways those algorithms can already be 
attacked and exploited is fairly well-known. We saw those attacks appear as altered 
pixels in image-recognition software that caused algorithms to mis-characterize images 
that look (to humans) like one thing, but to the software like something else. This can go 
beyond purely digital manipulation, working in the real world in various ways, too. For 
example, it was reported that with a few simple stickers, a stop sign was read by such 
an algorithm as a speed limit sign (Hutson, 2018), which can have all sorts of effects on 
autonomous cars (and our relationship to our cars is already understood as one of 
extension, broadly understood). Similar attacks have been carried out using vocal 
samples instead of visual ones, with researchers at Google reporting they were able to 
add inaudible elements “that sounded to humans like ‘without the data set the article is 
useless,’ but that an AI transcribed as ‘OK Google, browse to evil.com’” (ibid). These 
sorts of adversarial attacks are replicable and fairly-well understood by security 
researchers, but we haven’t considered the ways they might take on additional weight 
as they are deployed against personal devices or systems that comprise part of our 
extended selves. 
Since most of the literature that has dealt with the extended mind since the 
original publication of Clark and Chalmers (1998) has focused on the argument as it 
relates to mind, it is difficult to find critique of this extended view as it relates to both 
selfhood and security. However, Sterelny (2004) comes close, worrying about Otto (who 
he refers to as “Mr T”) and his notebook being potentially subject to what he calls 
“epistemic sabotage” (246). His argument largely rests on the notion that since Otto’s 
notebook is subject to manipulation and sabotage in a way Inga’s biological memory 
apparently isn’t, it cannot be equivalent enough in a way that matters to count as part of 
his extended mind. Sterelny worries about “thought insertion,” by way of someone 
writing in the notebook that Otto will later automatically endorse, as well as Otto having 
his beliefs stolen. He points out that “this set of problem[s] simply does not arise for 
such of Mr T’s information that he still encodes internally” (246). Clark uses this 
opportunity to double down on the arguments for extension, saying, “The point about 
vulnerability to malicious manipulation is well taken. Many forms of perceptual input are 
indeed subject, for that very reason, to much vetting and double-checking. I do not 
think, however, that we treat all our perceptual inputs in this highly cautious way. 
Moreover, as soon as we do not do so, the issue about extended cognitive systems 
seems to open up...” (60, 2006). In other words, everyone agrees that devices or 
systems that are not accessed introspectively as are our biological beliefs, for example, 
                                                          
3 There is more to be explored here on the legal ramifications of these claims. See, for example, Stephen 
B. Wicker, “Smartphones, Contents of the Mind, and the Fifth Amendment,” (April 2018), Communications 
of the ACM 16(4). A deeper discussion of this is forthcoming. 
4 In the original 1998 paper, Clark and Chalmers argue that four criteria must be met for some external 
thing to count as part of the extended mind (17). One of these is that when the information is available, it 
is automatically endorsed by the subject. 
are already subject to additional scrutiny. But Clark points out that not all externally-
accessed perceptual and biological systems are subject to such scrutiny. The 
aforementioned visual illusions, for example, are taken in by our bodies as immediate 
experiences of perception, and it takes additional cognitive analysis to begin to make 
sense of the ways our immediate experiences may not be trustworthy. The same would 
surely be true of Otto’s notebook, if he finds himself following its directions and 
recognizes that he is not at the museum but instead somewhere obviously different. We 
can understand a difference between our trust of something biological and some 
external artefact, but there are no cases for which we are always correct in that trust. As 
a result, it isn’t clear that our privileging of biology over artefact is somehow more 
accurate or natural or correct, particularly in making sense of selfhood. Clark continues, 
“For the reason we are vulnerable in just those kinds of cases is, I would argue, 
because we are relying on an ecologically sound strategy of treating the external scene 
as a stable, reliable substitute for internally-stored memory traces. In short, our brains 
have decided (if you will allow such loose talk for a moment) that on a day to day basis 
the chances of these kinds of espionage are sufficiently low that they may be traded 
against the efficiency gains of treating the perception involving loop as if it were an 
inner, relatively noise-free channel, thus allowing them to use the world as ‘external 
memory’” (60, 2008). Rather than using Sterelny’s worry about the difference in 
reference between the internal and external, Clark takes this to be further evidence for 
his claims with regard to the external mind (and which I am arguing also holds for the 
external self). He concludes, “But what emerges is not so much an argument against 
the extended mind as a way of further justifying our claim that in some contexts signals 
routed via perceptual systems are treated in the way more typical of internal channels 
(and vice versa, in the case of standard thought insertion). To decide, in any given case, 
whether the channel is acting more like one of perception or more like one of internal 
information flow, look (in part) to the larger functional economy of defenses against 
deception. The lower the defenses, the closer we approximate to an internal flow” (61). 
Therefore, even Otto’s notebook being tampered with isn’t a clear reason to believe it is 
deeply different than biological memory.  
 
 
Metaphysics is a Harsh Mistress 
 
This entire project rests on a few assumptions about the nature of embodiment and 
mind, namely, that the nature of the mind is not confined to the brain or to some 
ethereal Cartesian other-place of pure symbolic representation, but is instead 
something inherently embodied, embedded in a physical, social, and cultural world, and 
extended into some pieces of those environments in various ways under certain 
conditions. This holds also for the self, as I’ve argued. I find myself fighting a traditional 
Western understanding of mind and self that feels implicit in almost all work and is often 
stated outright in traditional scholarship about mind and self. However, I recognize that 
this assumption about a solitary, core self, once made explicit, often lurks in 
contemporary work, unargued for. In her discussion of virtual reality and embodiment 
(1999), Katherine Hayles offers a challenge to this underlying metaphysics that points 
out that people only feel threatened by something like the extended mind if their 
underlying metaphysical worldview insists on mind or self being that sort of unchanging, 
isolated core. She says, “As long as the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous 
self with unambiguous boundaries, the human-computer interface can only be parsed 
as a division between the solidity of real life on one side and the illusion of virtual reality 
on the other, thus obscuring the far-reaching changes initiated by the development of 
virtual technologies. Only if one things of the subject as an autonomous self 
independent of the environment is one likely to experience the panic… This view of the 
self authorized the fear that if the boundaries are breached at all, there will be nothing to 
stop the self’s complete dissolution. By contrast, when the human is seen as part of a 
distributed system, the full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to 
depend on the splice rather than being imperiled by it” (290). In other words, the entire 
fear of extension in relation to selfhood is completely dissolved if our starting 
assumption is one of distributed systems instead. But since we in the West rarely begin 
with that view, the extended self picture is one which receives a lot of pushback and 
fear.5 It is our naïve metaphysics of individualism which drives much of the worry with 
this worldview. As John Dewey wisely remarked, it was as if “they took the structure of 
discourse for the structure of things” (170). This mistake drives many of our confusions. 
 There are, of course, many metaphysical pictures for which this sort of extended 
self is not such a challenge. Louise Barrett, for example, points out that “…we can put it 
another way: if we think of cognition as an active process, and “mind” as something 
animals do rather than something they “have,” then questions about whether “minds” 
are things inside the head, or things that can exist outside them, don’t really make much 
sense” (199). There is extensive work in process metaphysics that would support the 
ideas of a distributed or extended self-system. A full survey of such views is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it is well-worth noting that these views are robust and 
historically strong, although generally under-explored in contemporary philosophy and 
psychology.6 If we start from a process view, it isn’t clear that the concerns about 
selfhood or mind and its lack of containment within a biological body and brain even 
arise, but, importantly, the security concerns still do. 
 
 
Security Concerns Remaining 
 
While it is unlikely that the metaphysics of selfhood has changed as our devices have 
evolved, our understanding of that relationship must. If we are extended selves, 
genuinely comprised of both the biology and the relevant pieces of the environment, we 
likely have been this kind of thing for a long historical time. (Indeed, there is a 
fascinating literature emerging that traces this view of extended selfhood backwards via 
material culture, at least several millennia.)7 If the argument here is correct, that these 
security concerns are not new, then we ought to be able to engage with some of that 
                                                          
5 Non-Western views more often start with Hayles’s more distributed understanding of self, or emphasize 
the idea that self is an illusion to begin with, and so we can use the label as needed for the sake of 
convenience. 
6 While you might trace process metaphysics in the West to Heraclitus, for the most robust versions, see 
Whitehead, for a historical approach, and Bickhard, for a robust contemporary one. 
7 See Malafouris 1997; 2008; 2013; Malafouris and Renfrew (eds.) 2010 
archaeological literature, and read into it ways that security could have been or was a 
worry, even if it was unacknowledged. Iphones and Google did not create these security 
issues; they merely offer us a unique bit of insight into our own ways of conceiving 
ourselves, while highlighting for us ways that we must be vigilant going forward, as 
these particular devices at this particular point in history take up the role of partly 
enacting distributed pieces of our selfhood. Metaphysics remains a harsh mistress, but 
perhaps this time we can be prepared to defend whatever parts of ourselves we 
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